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judging
On March 17, 2000, the Tattered Cover Book Store received
a "subpena" from the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")
and I began a fight to save the First Amendment.
by Joyce Meskis
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a boc i...
Qn March 17, 2000, the Tattered Cover BookStore receiv ed a "subpena" from the DrgEnforcement Agency ("DEA"). The"subpena" required that the TatteredCove  turn over the purchas  records of
one of the store's customers. Specifically, it asked for the
record relating to a mail order purchase, in addition to all
other transactions by this particular customer.
I immediately faxed the "subpena" to our attorney, Dan
Rccht, who informed me that it was an unenforceable
administrative subpoena. 1 We discussed the First
Amendment implications of this request. Dan said he
would call the DEA agent. Dan informed the agent of our
First Amendment concerns and stated that the Tattered
Cover would not turn over the information based on this
administrative request. He invited the agent to obtain a
real subpoena that we would then litigate. The agent
indicated to Dan that he did not want to do so, and Dan
was left with the impression they were going to let it
drop.
We thought the matter was over. However, early in
April Dan received a call from Fran Wasserman at the
Adams County District Attorney's office. Mr. Wasserman
told Dan that a search warrant was being sought in order
to obtain the information that the DEA "subpena" had
requested from the Tattered Cover. Dan felt that Mr.
Wasserman hoped to avoid the search warrant by getting
Dan's permission to obtain the information. Dan asked if
he could have until the end of the next business day
before any action was taken to give him time to contact
his client. Mr. Wasserman agreed.
I was incredulous when Dan called to tell me about his
conversation with Mr. Wasserman. A search warrant! No
opportunity for further judicial review! We agreed to mull
over the situation and discuss it the following day.
However, before we had an opportunity to have that
conversation, there were four law enforcement officers
(soon to be joined by a fifth) in my office, search warrant
in hand. I could not believe it! I raised the First
Amendment issues, talked about the Kramerbooks case,
which put a greater burden on authorities when it came
to searches and seizures of constitutionally protected
material,2 all to no avail. The officers allowed me to
contact Dan, who persuaded them to hold off on the
execution of the warrant for a week after a series of
conversations with the officers and Mr. Allen, in the
Denver District Attorney's office, who had signed off on
the warrant.
The search warrant had been narrowed somewhat from
the original request. It required the Tattered Cover to turn
over detailed information concerning the mail order
shipment, plus all transactional information relating to
that same customer during a one-month period.
We filed for and received a temporary restraining order
halting the execution of the search warrant. This allowed
us to litigate the subpoena in the Denver District Court.
That case was heard in October 2000, and the judgment
rendered half a loaf to each side. Judge J. Stephen Phillips
denied authorities (the North Metro Drug Task Force)
access to our customer's purchase records over the one-
month period. However, the judge ordered the Tattered
Cover to provide the information regarding the specific
mail order shipment it had contained.
The facts leading up to the search warrant unfolded
over time. Apparently, late in 1999 and early in 2000, the
North Metro Drug Task Force was investigating a
suspected mcthamphetainine lab in a trailer home in
Adams County. During the course of that investigation,
they sifted through the trash outside of the home. In so
doing, they found the leavings of a meth lab as well as an
empty mailing envelope with a Tattered Cover mailing
label on it addressed to a person living in the trailer
home. That label also had an invoice number printed on
it which could be used to identify the shipment.
The leavings of a meth lab found in the trash gave
police probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the
trailer home. In searching the home, they found a small
meth lab in a bedroom. They also found two new looking
books on the manufacture of methamphetamines.
Neither had Tattered Cover inventory control stickers on
them. One was still in a wrapper. Testimony in court also
alleged that neither had the appearance of having been
read.
The police found that there were as many as five or six
individuals living in or frequenting the trailer home. They
concentrated on identifying the occupant of the
bedroom, A list of suspects emerged, our customer being
Suspect A. Suspect A's address book was found in the
bedroom, along with other documents with the names of
other individuals. A lot of effort went into building the
prosecution of this case, but it all came to a screeching
halt with the issue of trying to tie the meth books to
Suspect A. The police testified that they saw this as a
"piece of the puzzle,"
However, when Fran Wasserman was approached to
sign off on the search warrant in Adams County, he
refused to do so. He indicated to the officers that more
investigation was needed. He asked them to check the
books for fingerprints and told them that they needed to
interview the suspects connected
with the trailer home. They
proceeded to dust the books, but /
found no useful fingerprints.
The officers did not do the
interviews in compliance with
Mr. Wasserman's request.
Instead, they sought the
search warrant from another jurisdiction-Denver.
I knew very little about the investigation when the
police arrived at the Tattered Cover with the search
warrant from the Denver County Court. As our
conversation unfolded, I asked one of the officers if our
customer (Suspect A) had been contacted so that
permission could be obtained for me to turn over the
information. The officer said that they had not because
the suspect was not the sort to give permission. I thought
that might indeed be true if those particular books
regarding the manufacture of methamphetamine had
been sent in the mailer. If they had not, our customer may
have given permission for the police to find out what had
been in the mailer. In any case, it seemed to me that
there was little to lose in asking, and something might be
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gained. The officer stressed that they just wanted the
inforomation regarding the mail order shipment. I asked
the officer what would happen if this did not reveal what
they expected it to. He replied that they would then take
the next step, which I interpreted to mean that they
would seek additional records from the
Tattered Cover. ... he would
The officers made it clear that they the informa
were not investigating the Tattered
Cover for illegal activity. I was sure that regarding ti
was the case, because the Tattered purchase v
Cover is a law-abiding business. I tried tO establish
to make it clear that the Tattered Cover in the bedr
did not intend to stand in the way of a then, did th
criminal investigation. As an only focus
establishment we are in agreement books abOL
with authorities that meth labs are a methamph
scourge on the community. We support
the police in the difficult job they do.
But, for the Tattered Cover, an individual consumer's
book purchase has serious First Amendment implications.
We also believe that it is incumbent on the police to
protect and honor our First Amendment rights. This case
requires a balancing of the necessity of the information
the government seeks against important constitutional
protections.
As the afternoon wore on, I asked one of the officers
how having a book in one's possession could play a role
in a conviction for illegal activity. He replied that it could
be introduced into evidence to establish the suspect's
state of mind. Curiously, months later he Would say that
the information regarding the book purchase was sought
to establish residency in the bedroom (the police had
residency in the trailer home established). Why then, did
the police only focus on the aooks about










Tattered Cover v. Thornton:
by Corey Ann Finn
T he Colorado Supreme Court handed down
Tattered Cover v. Thornton on April 8, 2 0 0 2 .1
The court found in favor of Joyce Meskis' bookstore,
the Tattered Cover, holding that the search warrant of
a bookstore customer's purchase record was
unconstitutional.
2
In 2000, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the
North Metro Task Force were monitoring a trailer in
Adams County, Colorado, because they suspected
that its occupants were manufacturing
methamphetamine. 3 Having searched through the
trash of the trailer and having executed a search of
the trailer pursuant to a warrant, investigators needed
to connect one of four occupants of the trailer to the
meth lab found in the trailer's bedroom. Suspecting a
connection between the books found in the bedroom
on the manufacture of methamphetamine and an
empty mailer from the Tattered Cover found in the
bedroom? Vhat Would have been the outcome if the
Tattered Cover had not soul the neth books to this
suspect? Would that have freed Suspect A of suspicion? I
did not think that was likely. How important exactly was
this "piece of the puzzle?" Was a "compelling need" (a
higher stanlard than probalble cause)
ay that clearly established? Given all of the
on evideic, woruld there still have been a
3 book case without the hooks? Conversely, if theo whole case hung on the books, was it a
s sought viable case?
esidency Some have asked me why I did not
rm... Why declare victoiy after the decision of the
police District Court. Would turning over this
n the information really impact our freedom to
read? I believe it would. Therefore, the
amines? Tattered Cover decided to appeal the
decision of the District Court. Briefs were
submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court
and the oral arguments were heard on I)ecember 5, 2001.
I am writing this at the end of February 2002 as we await
the decision of the court.
While the Tattered Cover is not arguing that the First
Aiendment enjoys absolute protection, it is arguing that
there shoui be and is a higher standard of protection. It
is, after all, one of the very most important pillars of our
government. In the Krawerbooks case, a District of
Columbia District Court judge ruled that Kenneth Starr, in
his subpoena of Monica Leasinsky's book purchase
records, could not have unfettered access to such
information in his investigation of President Clinton's
activities. She ruled that he must demonstrate a
compelling need for the information as it relates to such
an investigation, which is a highr standard than
probable cause. 3 That case never made it to the next step
continued on page 555
trash, investigators served the Tattered Cover with a
DEA administrative subpoena, requiring information
about the order sent to Suspect A and all other
purchases made by the suspect. About this initial
subpoena, the Colorado Supreme Court said that
'u]sing such a subpoena was ordinarily a successful
technique for DEA officers, though such a subpoena
lacks any force or legal effect'4 Meskis, through her
attorney, informed investigators of her unwillingness
to comply because of her concern for the privacy of
the bookstore's customers.
Investigators then sought and received a warrant
from a Denver County court, which they attempted to
execute. Pursuant to Meskis' attorney's request, the
district attorney who signed off on the warrant
voluntarily stayed its execution so the bookstore
could litigate it (in fact, the Tattered Cover did receive
a Temporary Restraining Order from the court).
continued on page 570
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continued frompage 531
employers' infornation may override
the interests of a state that has no
policy favoring sharing
infornation.3 1
A potential solution to all these
problems is allowing the parties to
nail down the applicable state law by
including a choice-of-law clause in
their employment contracts. 'tbis can
potentially ensure enforcement of the
clause against application of statc law
that protects employees or raiding
employcis. The Restatement
provides that the law designated in the
contract is not enforced as to a
regulatory issue if:
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the
chosen state would he contraiy to
a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the
particular issue and which, under
the rule of 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties.3
9
Since the chosen state is often the
employer's headquarters or at least a
branch office, the main issues
concern, not the relationship with the
chosen state,"O but whether another
state has a fundamental policy against
enforcement and that state's interests
outweigh the chosen state. The cases
reach varied results, but a review of 67
restrictive covenant cases involving
choice-of-law clauses shows that
clauses were enforced in 39 cases, not
enforced in 25 cases, and inteipreted
as inapplicable in three cases. To be
sure, further analysis is necessary to
determine the marginal effect of the
clause -that is, whether the court
would have reached the same result
under either law. But the courts'
tendency to enforce contractual choice
suggests that the clauses may have
some effect in inducing courts to
enforce
restrictive covenants.
This brief review of the law
suggests that the parties gain
something from these choice-of-law
clauses, even if they are frequently not
enforced. Where the law of a
contractually selected state is fairly
similar to that of another state x lose
law would apply in the absence of
contractual choice, but where the law
of the two states might go either way
with close facts, the court likely will
apply the selected law. Thus, a firm
may be able to gain predictability by
contracting for the application of the
law of a state that has experience with
these clauses or has enforced the
particular clause or clauses in
relevant industries.4' Also, even if the
two potentially applicable laws differ
significantly, a court may choose to
apply the less regulatory statute where
the fact situation is arguably not
covered by the more regulatory
statute.
42
How evxer, these clauses do not give
employers perfect protection. The
problem is that states ciforce their
own "fundamental" policies, while at
the sane tinxe refusing to apply tihe
laws of states that have weak
contacts with the contract. This often
means protecting local employers
against employers based out of state.
Consider, for example, Application
Group, Inc, v. Hunter Group, Inc.,43 in
which a California state court
protected a local employcr raiding an
employee of a Maryland firm despite a
Maryland choice of law clause.
Applying the Restatement 44, the court
held that California's anti-non-
compete policy applies to
employment involving performance of
'services for California-based
customers" even if the employee had
no prior contact with California and
does not reside in California. The court
reasoned:
In this day and age-with the
advent of computer technology
and the concomitant ability of
many types of employees in many
industries to work from their
homes, or to 'teleconmmute' to
work from anywhere a telephone
link reaches-an emlployce need
not reside in the same city,
county, or state in which the
employer can be said to
physically reside. California
employers in such sectors of the
economy have a strong and
legitimate interest in having broad
freedom to choose from a much
larger, indeed a 'national,'
applicant pool in order to
maximize the quality of the
product or services they provide,
coutniuted onpqge 56 7
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in the judicial process because Ms.
Lewinsky struck a deal with Mr. Starr
and voluntarily turned over the
records.
The Tattered Cover, in its case,
urged the court to apply the
compelling need standard. Wc
argued that the government did not
demonstrate a compelling need for
the information to make their case,
nor did authorities exhaust their
other alternatives in gathering
information. Only when there is
compelling need and there are no
other alternatives should First
Amendment guarantees be set aside.
continued on page570
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The government argued that the
information sought was only a
business record, that they could not
care less what the suspect read, and
that it could be used to establish a
state of rnind. They contended that a
book purchase is no different than a
hardware purchase record when it
comes to a criminal investigation. I
fundamentally disagree.
Entering books into evidence that
are found at a crime scene is one
thing. Seeking out who bought what
from a bookstore is another.
Purchasing, borrowing or "reading a
book is not a crime. "4 To edge closer
to using a customer's book purchase
records as an acceptable way of
determining criminal behavior is
disquieting at best, and downright
frightening at worst. Whether as a
reporter seeking information, an
iconoclast harmlessly pushing the
envelope of societal acceptance, or
even someone potentially
contemplating illegal behavior,
reading is not a crime.
The Tattered Cover is appreciative
of the thoughtful consideration Judge
Phillips gave to his decision. While
we are in disagreement with part of
that decision, we could not agree
more with the chilling effect that he
addressed when speech is thwarted.
Judge Philips stated: "It is clear that
the First Amendment of the
Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas,
regardless of social worth, and to
receive such information without
government intrusion or
obsenation" 5 He went on to quote
the late Supreme Court Justice
Douglas on the necessity for such
protection:
Once the government can
demand of a publisher the names
of the purchasers of his
publications, the free press as we
know it disappears. Then the
spectre of a government agent
will look over the shoulder of
everyone who reads. The
purchase of a book or pamphlet
today may result in a subpoena
tomorrow. Fear of criticism goes
with every person into the
bookstall, The subtle,
imponderable pressures of the
orthodox lay hold. Some will fear
to read what is unpopular, what
the powers-that-be dislike. When
the light of publicity may reach
any Student, any teacher, inquiry
will be discouraged. The books
and pamphlets that are critical of
the administration, that preach an
unpopular policy in domestic or
foreign affairs, that are in
disrepute in the orthodox school
of thought will be suspect and
subject to investigation. The press
and its readers will pay a heavy
price in harassment. But that will
be minor in comparison with the
menace of the shadow which
government will cast over
literature that does not follow the
dominant party line. If the lady
from Toledo can be required to
disclose what she read yesterday
and what she will read tomorrow,
fear will take the place of freedom
in the libraries, bookstores, and
homes of the land. Through the
harassment of hearings,
investigation, reports, and
subpoenas government will hold
a club over speech and over the
press.
6
When they heard about this case,
hundreds of outr customers took the
time to call or write to us in support
of our stand, underscoring this
message and raising their own
concerns about privacy and the
chilling effect on the Fi st
Amendment of requiring bookstores
to tmrn over to the police information
regarding the purchases of
customers,
continued frompage 525
When the trial court held that officers could seize the
record of the purchase that was delivered in the
maile, but denied them the right to confiscate other
records of the same customer, the Tattered Cover
appealed.
In its decision, the Colorado Supreme Court
explained "how the First Amendment and Article II,
Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution safeguard the
right of the public to buy and read books
anonymously, free from governmental intrusion.' 5
Accordingly, the court developed a test for whether
law enforcement officials may seek to seize the book
purchase records of an innocent, third-party
bookstore in order to gather evidence against a
customer. The test requires the government to
demonstrate a compelling need for the information
sought. "The court must then balance the law
enforcement officials' need for the bookstore record
against the harm caused to constitutional interests by
execution of the search warrant."6 The court also
held that "an innocent, third-party bookstore must be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing prior to the
execution of any search warrant that seeks to obtain
its cistomers' book-purchasing records."7 In this
hearing, the court is to apply the test created by the
Colorado Supreme Court.
In applying this test to the Tattered Cover search
warrant, the court looked at the government's three
justifications for wanting the record of the suspect's
purchase: (1) to prove that the suspect had the
necessary incus rea to be prosecuted for the
manufacture of methamphetamine, (2) to prove that
the suspect lived in the bedroom where the meth lab
and books were found and (3) to connect the suspect
to the crime. Analyzing each one separately, the
court held that the government showed no
sufficiently compelling interest to outweigh the
potential chilling effect on the right to buy books
anonymously.
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